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I. Historical review and Current fertility in China 
 
Although large family used to be desired by Chinese culture, the natural fertility level in 
China was never as high as that recorded in the Hutterites population.  According to historical 
studies, the TFR in the natural fertility regime was around 7-8 in Chinese society
1.   
The 1950s and the 1960s witnessed very high fertility, except for the period of 1959- 1961 
when mismanagement and natural disaster caused massive excess mortality and very low fertility 
(Peng, Xizhe, 1987).  China’s nation-wide fertility transition started in the early 1970s, which was 
initialised by the government sponsored family planning programme. Total fertility rate declined 
sharply from 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979, a more than fifty per cent decrease. While the 
government programme has played a crucial role in bringing down Chinese fertility, the 
fundamental changes that have taken place in China’s socio-economic structure since 1950 have 
also undermined the century-long reproductive norms and paved the way to the fertility reduction.  
It is often assumed that once fertility transition has started, the momentum will maintain and 
fertility will inevitably reach replacement level (Cleland & Wilson, 1987). However, China’s 
marked fertility reduction that had occurred in the 1970s did not get the same rapidity into the 
1980s, despite government efforts in implementing the much more rigid family planning 
regulation, the so-called “One-Child per family” programme. The potential for fertility decline 
created by the socio-economic changes of 1950-70s seems to be exhausted by the 1980s, leading 
to a TFR fluctuating between 2.3-2.9. 
Patterns of fertility transition in the 1980s indicate that China might have experienced two 
different kinds of fertility decline in these two decades. While the decline in the 1970s was mainly 
from high to low fertility, the 1980s witnessed a decline from low to near or even below 
replacement-level fertility. The two kinds of fertility decline cannot be considered different only in 
the numerical sense. It seems that the early transition is relative easier and could proceed fast in a 
                                                           
1 For example, see Zhongwei Zhao, ‘Deliberate Birth Control Under a High-fertility Regime: Reproductive   3
very short time period, but the later is much more difficult and requires somewhat more fundamental 
shift in socio-economic condition and the value system related to reproduction.  
The early 1990s witnessed another nation-wide downward trend of fertility, with the coastal 
‘opened-up’ areas at the fore. This new wave of fertility decline is certainly benefited from the 
economic reform and social changes generated from economic development. Moreover, the 
impact of the re-affirmed government commitment to population control should never be under-
estimated. According to official statistics, the TFR was reduced from 2.3 in 1990 to 2.0 in 1992, 
and has remained below replacement level since then.   
It has been a subject of controversy whether fertility in China was dropping as rapidly as 
indicated by the official statistics. Some demographers argue that the official birth statistics are 
subject to serious undercounting. (Zeng Yi 1995, Attane & Sun 1999) The State Family Planning 
Commission may be the only government agency in China that openly admits the problems in its 
statistics and tries to correct them. The commission has conducted annual random survey to 
double check quality of population data and made great efforts to improve the accuracy of 
statistics. Results from these surveys varied widely between provinces and regions. In areas like 
Shanghai and Jiangsu, it was reported that more than 99 per cent of the births were registered, 
while underreporting could mount to more than 20 per cent in some other rural locations
2.   
 It is interesting to note that the total fertility rates of the 1990s that were derived from 
several national surveys, both conducted by the State Statistics Bureau and the State Family 
Planning Commission, are consistently around 1.6-1.8 after adjustments, in spite of changes in 
sample selection and methods of field work
3. Other researches, more or less, echo these 
estimations
4. So far, there is no single estimation of TFR that is widely accepted by the scholars. 
However, the publicised official figure, say TFR around 1.7-1.8, in my opinion and also 
commonly cited by researchers, is not far away from the reality
5.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Behavior in China before 1970’, Population and Development Review, 23(4): 729-767 
2 As these surveys were conducted in small scale, these data could not be used to represent the provincial 
features of birth reporting, or to infer to the national pattern.  
3 These surveys include 1992୍ݓࡅ࠹߃ളტ຾ჴ߶֥ 38 ຣದטҰ, 1995୍ಆݓ 1%ದ१ԎဢטҰ, 
etc. 
4  For example, a recent study based on the estimation of total population of China claims that given 15 per 
cent of birth underreporting, China’s total fertility rate in the late 1990s should around 1.8. Given 10 per 
cent underreporting, the TFR should be 1.69. See Cui Hongyan, ‘On the Total Population of China’, 
Population Research (renkou yanjiu), 2000. No. 5 p.3  
5 It is unwise at present to discuss the issue of real fertility rate, as valid data sets are not adequately 
available. In a Chinese Government Directive issued in March 2000, it just simply indicates that China’s 
fertility is below ‘replacement level’.  See also Yu Xuejun & Xie Zhenming (Ⴟ࿐फđ ࢳᆒૼ) eds.  
China’s Population Development Review (ᇏݓದ१ؿᅚ௟ંĎ, P. 41-43đBeijing: People’s Publishing   4
 Figure 1 about here  
 
II. Ethnic and regional differentials 
 
Fertility level remains quite different between ethnic population groups. As birth control has 
long been vigorously implemented among the majority Han population, family planning programme 
has just started its formation for some minority nationalities (such as Tibet population). Among 
China's 55 minority groups, the fertility level of Korea and Manchu women was very low that their 
TFRs were only 1.56 and 1.86 respectively in 1989, but were the highest among the Uygur and 
Kazak nationalities (TFRs are 4.65 and 4.74). Table 1 presents the fertility trends among five large 
minority populations living in China's minority autonomous regions.  
 






Guang xi  Tibet  Ningxia  Xinjiang 
  Mongol  Han Zhuang Han  Tibet Hui Han Uygur  Han 
1970-1974 6.07  5.05 5.54  5.25  5.11  6.70 5.48 6.13 5.20 
1975-1979 3.68  3.05 5.16  5.26  4.70  6.61 4.06 5.87 3.69 
1980-1984 3.33  2.43 4.35  3.65  5.23  5.45 3.05 6.03 2.77 
1985-1989 2.68  1.91 3.50  3.19  4.44  3.58 2.58 5.09 2.42 
Sources: Adapted from Yang Shuzhang: 'Fertility Transition of the Ethnic Population in the Autonomous 
Region of China', Paper presented at the National Seminar on Minority Population and family Planning, Sept. 
1992, Yanji City, PRC.  
 
There are always marked regional variations in fertility among China’s provincial units, but 
the gap has been narrowing in the recent years.  Table 2 presents the statistics of provincial TFR 
in different decades of the second half of the 20th century.  It shows that while the means of 
provincial TFR has declined continuously through the years, the deviation from the national 
pattern increased first and reached the peak in the 1970s, and declined thereafter. This 
phenomenon is clearly associated with the different path of fertility transition among China’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
House, 2000.    5
provincial units. While big municipalities began their fertility decline as early as in the early 
1960s, fertility transition only started in 1980s in some of the western provinces. Even with this 
regional variation, it seems clear that there has been a general trend of fertility convergence over 
time, which is evidenced by the decline of the fertility variance.  
 
Table 2 Statistics of TFR in various decades  
Decades Means Variance Standard 
deviation 
1950s 6.176  0.323  0.568 
1960s 6.036  0.835  0.914 
1970s 3.876  1.751  1.323 
1980s 2.280  0.559  0.748 
1995 2.198  0.276  0.525 
1997-99 1.609 0.212  0.460 
                 Sources:  Peng & Huang, 1993; Chen, 1995; Figure 3.  
Figure 3 about here 
 
III. Major determinants of China’s fertility transition  
 
Given the characteristics of China’s fertility transition, three factors, the government 
commitment and population programme, the socio-economic development, and reproductive 
culture, must be taken into consideration in any analysis of future fertility trend in China.  
 
1. The role of government population policy and programme 
 
China’s general population policy at present can be described as ‘Controlling population 
quantity, improving the quality of life, and make efforts to solve aging problem’. The family 
planning programme is the core of China's national population programme, which is mainly 
managed by the State Population and Family Planning Commission with support from other 
government agencies and various NGOs such as China Family Planning Association and All-
China Women's Federation etc.  
The success of China’s birth control has for a long time been heavily depended on 
government administrative intervention. The programme was initialised at the first instance by 
the central government and carried out through top-down network. Since later 1980s, a target   6
responsibility system has been gradually established. The system requires that heads of Party 
organisations and governments at all levels take the full responsibility for implementing 
population programme, through comprehensive management and co-operation between 
governmental departments and non-governmental organisations, and between different 
development policies and programmes. It aims to ensure the fulfilment of the population growth 
plan that is set up for each locality.  Meanwhile, individual cadres’ career development and 
position promotion would be closely affected by their achievements in family planning.  
The basic principles of the family planning programme are ‘to promote late marriage and 
deferred childbearing, to encourage people to have fewer but healthier births, to promote the 
practice of ‘one child per couple’ and to encourage a longer birth spacing for couples who have 
practical difficulties if they only have one child.’  This policy took considerable time to develop 
and the intention for further improvement has never been given up, even though the Government 
repeats the confirmation of ‘keeping the family planning policy stable’ each year. 
One of the salient features of China’s family planning programme is its decentralised policy 
formation and operation. Under the general guidance from the central government, it is the local 
governments, primarily the provincial governments that are responsible for the formulating and 
implementation of the programme. In other words, local authorities have been given some 
flexibility in adapting the national policy in order to accommodate the vast regional differentials 
in social, economic and cultural conditions. As a result, the current family planning regulations 
can be grouped into four major categories
6. (Table 3) 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Various Local Family Planning Regulations, 1990s 
Group Major  Policy  Regulations  Coverage 
1  One child with very few exceptions in 
allowing couples to have two children
All urban residents and rural couples 
in Jiangsu and part of Sichuan 
province 
2  Two children if the first one is a girl 
3  Two children with a four-year spacing
Most rural couples  
4  Two or three children  Minorities in the rural areas of 
minority autonomous regions 
5  No numerical regulation  Rural Tibetan population 
Sources: Details of provincial family planning regulations are available at www.cpirc.org.cn (accessed 
15 Aug. 2002). 
                                                           
6 Detailed discussion of the issue could be seen in Xie Zhenming, ‘Population Policy and the Family 
Planning Programme’, in Peng Xizhe and Guo Zhigang (eds.), The Changing Population of China, pp.54-
55, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.    7
 
If all Chinese couples follow local family planning regulations, the total cohort fertility rate 
in China should be 1.62, but be 1.5 as more Chinese become urban residents
7.  
Financial incentive and disincentive measures have been widely used in the programme. 
Since 1991, the political commitment to population control has been reaffirmed and the mass is 
widely mobilised once again
8. As a positive result of these commitments, financial input for 
family planning has increased steadily. More personnel have been recruited and trained to work 
in the family planning programme. The quality of birth control service has to some extent been 
improved. Moreover, the government requires that relevant social and economic policies should 
be in compliance with the population policy. These measures work effectively in terms of public 
awareness and the implementation of population programmes, and play an important role in 
further fertility decline in the 1990s. 
Along with the strong government commitment, the programme has now put more emphases 
on people’s volunteer participation. Couples are expected to, under the general guidance of 
government population policies, make autonomous decisions regarding the methods of 
contraception, birth interval and other reproductive health matters. Efforts have been made to 
promote education and information dissemination, and on provision of better, continuous and 
regular contraceptive service. Moreover, family planning programme has extended to other fields 
relevant to people’s daily life in order to attract wide voluntary participation. Various 
experimental projects relating family programme with women’s empowerment and community 
development have also been carried out. Many of them are supported by international 
organisations such as Ford Foundation. 
There are shortcomings as other mass programmes. China's family planning programme is 
heavily reliant on female contraceptive methods
9. The programme has been promoted for a long 
time with little strong support from other socio-economic institutions, so that it has been mainly 
implemented through government administrative network. The programme requires couples to 
reduce the number of children they produce, but is unable by it to provide adequate social support 
for people to adjust their strategy for family formation and necessary compensation for couples to 
                                                           
7 This is refereed as the policy fertility, which is a weighted average assuming reproductive behaviours of 
all couples in different locations and of different nationalities following the local government family 
planning regulations.  The figure was calculated by the State Family Planning Commission in early 1990s 
based on demographic structural pattern (rural-urban, Han-minority, etc.) that was prevailed at that time.  
8 Such as the fully implementation of family planning responsibility system, the start of the annual 
conference on population and family planning work which is held during the time of the annual national 
People’s Congress in March, and participated by all central and provincial top leaders.   
9 According to government statistics, male methods accounted for only 14.7 and 13.1 pert cent of total 
contraception in 1994 and 1999 respectively.     8
alleviate life risks in the context of low fertility. The later task is certainly beyond the capacity of 
the family planning programme. In some cases, coercive measures were taken by local cadres 
although the government emphasis on Mass line and against coercion in general.  The 
relationship between societal interests and individual rights is also an area that needs to be 
improved.  
 
2. Socio-economic development 
 
China’s fertility decline was initialised by strong and effective government-sponsored family 
planning programme. Nevertheless, socio-economic development is certainly another decisive 
factor that facilitating the transition. With the time passing, the importance of the socio-economic 
factors on fertility trend has been rising
10.  
Rapid social changes have occurred since the late 1970s as the economic reform commenced. 
But the speed and the profundity of the reform are much more extraordinary after the release of a 
speech by top Chinese leader Mr. Deng Xiaoping calling for fast reform in early 1992.  The entire 
Chinese economy is moving dramatically from a central planned one towards a market economy. 
In accordance with this shift, remarked changes could be easily seen in almost every aspects of 
the society.  These changes inevitably lay their marks on China’s future population dynamics and 
socio-economic development.  
As the country’s economy is advancing at an unprecedented speed, or even overheated, more 
people now are involved in the commercial activities. In the countryside, more peasants are 
preparing to leave their land to cities and other places with better economic opportunities. The 
volume of temporary migration from the rural to the urban and between regions as well, soared in 
the last a few years and reached 10 million marks.  In the urban sectors, job security is facing 
great challenge. Urban residents are for the first time suffering from unemployment. Meanwhile, 
people have got much more freedom to make their own employment decisions. Chinese people 
are much more mobile (both geographically and socially) than ever before. This change greatly 
reduces government’s ability to monitor population dynamics and the family planning 
programme which is by and large a community-based (working units or residential places) 
programme at present. While people are free from the authority of their previous places of 
                                                           
10 For example, Lin Fude and Liu Jinting claimed that during the period between 1982 and 1990, the 
importance of family planning program on China’s fertility level declined, while the importance of socio-
economic factor almost doubled.  See: Lin Fude and Liu Jinting, ‘China’s Fertility Transition and the 
Prospect of Population Situation’, in Proceedings of the  Symposium on Demography of China, 23
rd IUSSP 
general Population Conference, Beijing: China Population association   9
working or residences, they are also free from benefits they used to be entitled to obtain, such as 
free contraceptive services.
11  
Absolute poverty has been gradually alleviated. The number of the impoverished population 
reduced from 100 million in the early 1990 down to 40 million by the end of 1998
12 and further 
down to 26 million in 2005.  The Chinese government is determined to take more resolute action 
to solve food and clothing problems for those people living in China’s poverty-stricken areas by 
2000
13.  Poverty is one of the major factors that result in high fertility and resistance to birth 
control in China’s countryside. Poverty eradication, therefore, is certainly to provide a relatively 
better working condition for China’s population programme.  
The education level of Chinese people is fairly low. The illiterate rate for people aged 15 and 
over remained at 22 per cent in 1990. There are only 142 collage graduates among every 10,000 
population in China, and the same figure is 1492 and 637 in USA and Japan respectively. There 
are improvements along with the economic development. For instance, the number of illiterate 
people aged 15 to 47 has dropped by 4 million annually since early 1990s when the number was 
around 35 million
14. The illiterate rate for this age group has declined from 10 per cent in 1990, to 
7 per cent in 1995, and expected to be below 5 per cent by the end of the century
15.  On the whole, 
illiteracy is a problem overwhelmingly among the older age groups.  90 per cent of illiterate 
people are peasants, and concentrated mainly in a few western provinces.  The positive impact of 
education attainment on fertility reduction is well documented. It could be reasonably expected 
that further education improvement would contribute to maintain the low fertility in the future.  
With the reform advancing, people's income has increased very rapidly and to some extent 
out of government control. So is the cost of living, especially the cost of rearing children. Saving 
for children’s education has already been the major consideration that determining the 
consumption behaviour in China. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening. New social 
stratification is emerging.  People are stimulated by the hope of being rich. Under this 
circumstance, to have many children becomes irrational economically and a burden of the social 
                                                           
11  This is especially the case for millions of female floating population.  China’s family planning 
programme has made efforts to handle the issue with various experiments, such as assigning the receiving 
area to take the major responsibility for contraceptive service.  
12 Since 1985, China has begun its large-scale poverty alleviation programme. The definition of poverty in 
China is mainly an economic one based on the per capita annual income. The criterion has changed over 
time, from 200 RMB Yuan in 1985, to 300 Yuan in 1991, 400 Yuan in 1994.  
13 The China Population Today Vol. 13, No.5-6 provides a briefing on this issue. 
14 Figures refer to people who are no longer belonging to the illiterate category in a specified year. As a 
certain portion of the group return to illiterate status a few years later, the sum of these figures should be 
used with caution.  
15 See ಆݓ࢝ტ൙ြࣴ໴࠹߃ބ 2010୍ؿᅚܿ߃đ ᇏݓ࢝ტ҆đ 1996   10
mobility.  This has a positive effect on people's acceptance of birth control, at least for the coming 
years.  
It is too early to draw any conclusions regarding the impact of rapid social changes at 
present on China's population dynamics.  While some are beneficial to family planning 
programme, others may be unfavourable. Some changes undermine the government capacity to 
manipulate people’s reproductive behaviour; some others could facilitate further fertility 
reduction. For the long run, socio-economic development will make the population control easier. 
But what will be the case in a period of sudden and sharp change, especially with the larger 
cohort of fertile women, remains a crucial question to be answered. Efforts must be, and have 
already been, made to rethink the strategy of China's family planning programme in order to 
adapt to the changing situation.  A few experiments have been carried out in some rural counties 
to integrate the rural community development with family planning programme, and to set 
examples at which the birth control will more rely on voluntary participation with very limited 
government intervention. The next few years will be crucial in terms of China's population 
control. 
 
3. Changes in reproductive culture 
The major features of marriage patterns in recent decades for China as a whole can be 
summarised in four main points. (1) The Chinese pattern of universality of first marriage has 
evidently been continued. (2) The age at first marriage increased dramatically in the 1970s, but 
decreased in 1980s with a modest scale, and increased again in the early 1990s. (3) There are 
significant differences of timing at first marriage among Chinese cities, towns and rural areas. (4) 
The first marriage of Chinese women has been concentrated at a rather narrow age interval. (Zeng 
Yi, 2000) 
However, some radical changes in nuptiality have already emerged, especially in big cities 
like Shanghai.  The proportion of unmarried women in their early 30s increased sharply in recent 
years in Shanghai, particularly among white-collar employees. According to fragmental 
information, about 3 per cent of women aged 30 remained single in 1997, while the figure was 
less than 1 per cent in the 1980s. The interval between marriage and the first childbearing 
increased from 1 year to near 2.5 years, as more young couples would like to spend longer years 
without the burden of childbearing. The number of voluntary childless couple is also rising in the 
recent years.  The cases of premarital cohabitation are also increasing
16. On the whole, people in 
                                                           
16 Unfortunately, there are no solid data on above-mentioned new phenomenon. But interested readers 
could find many TV series, novels, and other media materials touching on this issue.    11
cities like Shanghai are taking a much more tolerate attitude towards marriage and sex activities, 
although the traditional ethic remains strong.  We could expect that such a trend would continue 
into the next century and expend to other regions and social groups as well.  
It is shown from population census data that the average number of children per household 
decreased from 1.49 in 1982 to 1.12 in 1990. Comparing the mean household sizes of 4.43 in 
1982 and 4.05 in 1990, average persons per household reduced by 0.38, the reduced births during 
the eight inter-sensual years make up 97 per cent of the shrinking size of household or family. 
The nuclear family has taken an important place and this pattern is gradually expanding in society. 
However, the stem family holds as the leading pattern in society and most of the elderly still live 
with their adult children. The intra-family relationship has been changing to be much more 
equalised between generations, as the traditional pattern of parent domination, especially in terms 
of marriage and childbearing, is gradually given away.  This provides much more autonomy for 
the young couples to make their own reproductive decision with less intervention from their 
parents as they did in the past.  
The Change in marriage and family patterns is partly brought about by the past fertility 
transition. Meanwhile, it also affects the fertility desire and behaviour of the young generation. 
Based on survey reports, we know that the average desired family size varied narrowly between 
1.6-2.5 over time and across regions. It means that large family has been no longer the desire of 
Chinese people. Some may argue that many of these replies from the interviewees were biased by 
the policy enforcement. Nevertheless, it can be sure that ‘two children per family’ has been the 
widely desired family pattern regardless rural-urban stratification.   
 
III. Factors that affecting regional variations in fertility  
As discussed in the foregoing sections, there are always marked regional variations in 
fertility patterns, both in terms of the absolute level and the path of change. In this section, we try 
to provide statistic evidence that determining regional disparities. 
Based on our understanding of the fertility transition, relevant socio-economic indicators are 
chosen and conventional statistic analysis is carried out. Data from table 4 reveals that the general 
relationships between fertility level and selected socio-economic variables are maintained. But 
the relative importance of various socio-economic factors on fertility has changed over time. On 
the whole, the government population policy and programme (indicated by Policy TFR) and 
general level of socio-economic development (represented by Per Capita GDP and Consumption, 
and Proportion of Urban Population etc.) are the most crucial determinants of China’s regional 
fertility variation. Figure 4 is just an example of such close relations.  (Table 4)   12
 
Table 5. Correlation Coefficients between TFR and selected socio-economic variables  
Variables 1980s  1995  1997-99 
Per Capita GDP  -0.61  -0.74  -0.601 
Proportion of Urban Population  -0.57  -0.71  -0.513 
Per Capita Consumption  -0.55  -0.69  -0.569 
Policy TFR    0.76   0.69    0.792 
Female late Marriage Rate  -0.55  -0.19  -0.193 
Female Contraceptive Prevalence  -0.81  -0.23  -0.334 
Female Illiterate Rate    0.56   0.60  0.713 
Sources: see table 4. 
  The above analysis shows that there is a strong association between fertility and the 
proportion of urban and minority populations at the aggregated level. In general, provinces 
with a high proportion of urban population and a low proportion of minority population have 
achieved low fertility. It reflects the fact that deliberate fertility control was first adopted by 
the Han population and started in urban and coastal areas, then gradually adopted by other 
minority populations and diffused to rural and inland areas. It also reflects differences in the 
family planning policy and its implementation between Han and minority populations and 
between urban and rural areas. However, we should also note the considerable heterogeneity 
in urbanisation and population's ethnic composition among provinces with a similar fertility. 
 
 V. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In March 2000, Chinese government issued a directive to reaffirm its commitment to 
population control
17. It also indicates that the present population policy will more or less maintain 
in effects for the coming years, allowing some minor modification. Under this context, together 
with the findings from early sections of the paper, the government population policy will decide 
the basic level of China’s fertility, at least for the early 21
st century. The deviation from this line 
will be determined jointly by the ability of the government to implement its policy and 
programme, the impact of development in China’s social, economic and political reform, and 
people’s general desire for family size.  It seems most likely that the Chinese government will 
                                                           
17 “Decision on Strengthening Population and Family Planning Work, Maintaining low Fertility”(ᇏ܋ᇏန
ݓༀჽܱႿࡆ఼ದ१ა࠹߃ളტ۽ቔ໗ק֮ളტඣ௜֥थקĎ, Directive issued by CCCP and the 
State Council, 2
nd March 2000.   13
maintain its commitment to population control, and will make every effort to achieve its 
population target in the 21
st century
18. Meanwhile, people’s volunteer participation and free 
determination will play much more important roles in determine the future fertility level in China.  
The transformation of government organisations and functions is under way. The basic idea 
is to make the government focusing on certain important issues and the society will take care of 
the remaining things, or so-called ‘small government and big social services’ in Chinese. The 
government system is undergoing a profound restructure. Although the Family Planning 
Commission remains within government system, its staff numbers are due to be reduced, this is 
inevitably affecting the family planning programme. It is reported that in some local areas, the 
family planning commission, especially its technical unit, is transferred to be non-government 
institutions and financially independent with partial government subsidies. This change may not 
directly affect the quality of contraceptive service, but may make it more difficult now to keep 
people working for family planning programmes as job security reduces.  Together with other 
administrative restructure, this shakes the foundation of China’s current family planning 
programme since it has been largely depended on effective administrative system. Another 
development in the political field is the direct election of the village management committee that 
is responsible for the daily operation of China’s Population programme. The election itself would 
reduce the occurrence of coercion and increase the volunteer participation.  
There are different projections about the future fertility level in China. (E.g. Jiang, Zhenghua, 
1998; Zhai Zhenwu, 2000) Three kinds of fertility assumptions are provided in light of the above-
described trends in China: 1) TFR is assumed constant at the 1990 level (2.3); 2) TFR will 
maintain at a level around 2; 3). TFR will go down further from 2 by 2000 to 1.7-1.8, a value 
representative of the average level of the more developed countries in the early 1990s
19. While 
the first assumption reflects the general concern about the difficulties in the implementation of 
current population programme, the other two share a relatively optimistic view.  
There are concerns about the vulnerability of China’s fertility transition and the possibility 
of fertility rebound if the government, either voluntarily or forced to, loses control on population 
issues.  On the other hand, the optimistic view takes into account the determination and capacity 
of the government in carrying out family planning plus the significant impact on people’s 
reproductive behaviour of the fundamental changes that have occurred in China’s society and 
economy since the opening and reform. 
                                                           
18 Based on different fertility assumptions, the population targets by the middle of the 21
st century range 
from 1.5-1.6 billion, and but should never exceed 1.6 billion. 
19 For example, in 1990, North Europe had a TFR of 1.8, West Europe 1.7, and North America 2.0.   14
At the launch of the One-Child-Policy, the intention was made clear that this should be a 
policy measure for a period of only 20 to 30 years.
20 After more than 20 years of implementation, 
it has met its primary objective to slow down China’s population growth. On the other hand, there 
are also profound socio-economic and demographic consequences. Current policy debates have 
concentrated on these issues.  
  In 2000, there were 88.11 million elderly (people over 65 years), and the proportion in 
the total population for the first time in China’s history exceeded 7 per cent, indicating that for the 
country as a whole, China had become an “aged society”.
21 The total elderly population (aged 
65+) increased up to 100.45 million in 2005, occupied 7.69% of the overall population, an 
increment of 13.58 million over this five-year period. The number is expected to increase by 3 
times over the first half of the 21st century.  
An aging population has long been a major challenge facing many cities and the wealthier 
rural areas in the eastern region. In Shanghai, 13 per cent of the city population is 65 and above. 
On the other hand, Qinghai province is projected to enter the aging society stage in as late 
as 2014. Regional variations in population aging are very similar to the regional variations in 
current fertility, indicating that the aging process is mainly determined by the decline in fertility. 
An abnormal sex ratio at birth is another issue linked to China’s fertility transition. 
Researchers in the late 1980s attributed the situation mainly to misreporting of births.22 However, 
it soon became clear that it was real and that pre-birth selective abortion in favor of boys was the 
primary cause.23 The government has employed tough measures to try to prevent and reverse the 
trend, but with very limited success. The continuous and increasing skew in the sex ratio at birth 
indicates that the situation has worsened over the years.
24 In 1982 it was 108.5, and 110.9 by 1987, 
111.3 by 1990,115.6 by 1995 and 119.9 by 2000.
25  
                                                           
20 See Guanyu kongzhi woguo renkou zengzhang wenti zhi quanti gongchan dangyuan, gongqing tuanyuan 
de gongkaixin (An Open Letter to All Members of the Communist Party and Communist Youth League), 
Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party, 25 Sep. 1980. 
21 National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, Communiqué on Major Figures of the 
2000 Population Census, no. 1, 28 Mar. 2001. 
22 For example, Zeng Yi, et al., “Causes and Implications of the Recent Increase in the Reported Sex Ratio 
at Birth in China,” Population and Development Review 19, no.2 (1993): 283-302. 
23 According to the 2000 Population Census, the sex ratio for the 0-4 and 5-9 age groups is 119.5 and 114.4, 
respectively. If misreporting caused the abnormal sex ratio at birth, it would re-appear in the young age 
groups in the census or surveys conducted a few years later. This is certainly not the case in China.  
24 Regulations, including heavy penalties, have been set up in many provinces/regions to prevent medical 
doctors from using ultrasound machines to identify the sex of the foetus.  See for example, http://sdrd.sd-
china.com/zfjd/400012 (accessed 23 Nov. 2002). 
25 Report from China’s State Family Planning Commission. See http://www.sfpc.gov.cn/cn/news20020516-
1.htm (accessed 2 Nov. 2002).   15
Some blamed the rigid implementation of the family planning programme as the major cause. 
Indeed, there is some kind of relationship between the fertility level and abnormality of sex ratio 
at birth. Provinces with a normal or slightly higher sex ratio at birth actually belong to two groups. 
One is where there is a concentration of minority people and the fertility rate is relatively higher, 
the other group is where there is low fertility. The most serious problem is occurring in the 
provinces/regions which fall somewhere in between. However, similar abnormality can also be 
found in South Korea and India where there are very different family planning programmes.
26 
Despite all the shortcomings, China’s family planning programme has been supported in 
large by the public. On the whole, it has brought about dramatic changes in people's fertility 
behaviour in a relatively short period, and successfully slowed down the rapid population growth 
in China, which also has profound impact on the stabilisation of the world population. There 
should be no technical difficult for China’s to reach its population target. Research and production of 
contraceptive devices have always been put at a very favourable position. The deepened involvement 
of China into globalisation of world economy may further facilitate the introduction of new and more 
effective birth control methods. If the political stabilisation and current path of development in 
China are maintained, it is quite possible for China to maintain a TFR around 1.7-1.8 in the 
middle of the next century. 
Efforts to formulate a Family Planning Law began in the late 1970s. Although population 
control is written in China’s Constitution and other national laws such as the Marriage Law, it 
was only on 29 December 2001 that the Law was formally passed by the Standing Committee of 
China’s National People’s Congress at its 25th meeting, after more than 20 years of preparation, 
four rounds of debate, and more than 30 drafts. The Law came into effect as of September 2002. 
Though its 47 items mainly reaffirm existing policy guidance and principles, its implementation 
does have significant implications for China’s future population policy and programme. It makes 
clear that the current population policy will more or less remain unchanged in the near future, but 
the responsibility of modifying policy measures and regulations is assigned to provincial/regional 
governments, based on local conditions. 
On the whole, the author takes a relatively optimistic view regarding China’s general 
development and the fertility future as well. More recently, volunteer participation is reaffirmed 
in the operation of family planning programme. Reproductive Health is being widely publicised 
and becoming a well-know term in China.  While the society interests remain as the major 
                                                           
26 See for example, Chai Bin Park and Nam-Hoon Cho, “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-fertility 
Society: Imbalance of Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea,” Population and Development Review 21, no. 1 (1995): 
59-84.   16
rational for China’s population policy and programme, individual’s rights get more attention.  
There have always been gaps between the targets of the programme and public acceptance, but 
the gaps reduced with the time passing.  Small family norm has been widely accepted by the 
public, especially in those advanced regions. ‘Two Children Per Family’ will be gradually a 
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Beijing 1.00  12740.18    3380.91  63.74    1.33 84.51  90.08  11.18 
Tianjin 1.64  13256.40    4515.44  56.54    1.35 62.76  91.66  16.19 
Hebei  2.19  5286.36   1863.23  16.04   1.67 51.76  92.12  22.13 
Shanxi  2.15  4182.33   1673.99  23.36   1.69 64.45  90.25  14.33 
Inner 
Mogolia 
1.97  4204.37   1851.51  31.86   1.80 72.45  91.89  23.60 
Liaoning  1.69  7753.83   3133.16  43.61   1.50 61.55  91.41  12.61 
Jiling  1.85  5000.48   2543.84  40.94   1.50 49.09  73.21  13.80 
Heilongjiang  1.88  6350.31   2803.65  43.81   1.44 48.88  93.12  15.50 
Shanghai 0.99  21162.14    6807.01  69.37    1.28 62.43  92.45  15.39 
Jiangsu  1.89  8410.36   2922.29  23.40   1.52 70.59  93.60  27.62 
Zhejiang  1.61  9439.68   3186.09  17.67   1.54 73.72  92.24  25.07 
Anhui  2.25  3841.93   1932.08  16.66   1.61 67.70  90.27  29.67 
Fujian  2.26  8212.25   3336.42  18.00   1.61 49.73  91.25  32.94 
Jiangxi  2.41  3634.64   1681.66  19.97   1.52 29.57  92.94  24.39 
Shandong  2.01  6719.48   2309.81  22.43   1.55 99.05  92.22  32.81 
Henan  2.74  3924.30   1548.44  14.80   1.56 67.00  90.12  23.55 
Hubei  2.29  5085.01   2210.25  24.47   1.55 49.32  92.85  25.46 
Hunan  2.16  4129.64   2035.93  16.81   1.64 41.71  93.57  21.24 
Guangdong  2.34  9433.48   4082.37  27.50   1.85 71.59  85.44  22.09 
Guangxi  2.72  3666.72   1833.35  15.31   1.57 61.52  90.09  21.35 
Hainan  2.67  5395.65   2268.43  22.65   1.97 66.94  84.79  27.39 
Sichuan  1.85  3584.76   1764.97  16.06   1.57 34.36  91.23  26.25 
Guizhou  2.85  1960.72   1283.15  12.98   1.74 52.46  92.58  45.00   19
Yunnan  2.61  3542.63   1661.79  13.15   2.13 42.89  84.08  39.68 
Xizang  3.48  2332.50   1172.08  13.73   -  -  -  68.98 
Shannxi  2.57  3233.22   1557.24  19.84   1.64 57.28  90.73  28.84 
Gansu  2.05  2781.93   1343.92  17.16   1.58 47.08  88.22  44.52 
Qinghai  2.37  3638.22   1714.20  28.16   2.08 53.67  84.99  55.04 
Ningxia  2.53  3604.47   1674.68  25.39   2.06 45.50  90.26  34.17 
Xinjiang 2.92  5309.63    2351.10  34.02    2.40 82.44  80.77  17.47 
China 2.20  6066.64    2427.51  26.98    1.62 58.85  90.40  25.54 
Note:    Per Capita GDP refers to Average value of 1994-1998, compatible prices.  
Per Capita Consumption refers to Average of 1995, 1997 and 1998, 1995 price. 
 Proportion of Urban refers to the average of 1991-1994 and 1997 
Policy TFR refers to the weighted average of people covered by different family planning 
regulations in the later 1980s, which remained more or less unchanged in the 1990s. 
Female late marriage refers to 1995 
Female contraceptive rate refers to the average of 1990, 1993 and 1995 
Female illiterate rate refers to 1996 
Sources:  
1. China Statistics Yearbook, 1985-1999 
2. China Population Statistics Yearbook 1988-1998 
3. China Family Planning Yearbook 1986-1996  
4.  Fertility data cited from Chen Wei,  ‘ China’s Low fertility’, in the Special Issue of 
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